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ABSTRACT
What is the impact of firms that cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital in international
stock markets on the liquidity of remaining firms in domestic markets? Using a panel of over 3,200
firms from 55 countries during 1989-2000, we find that internationalization reduces the liquidity of
domestic firms through two channels. First, the trading of international firms migrates from domestic
to international markets and the reduction in domestic liquidity of international firms has negative
spillover effects on domestic firm liquidity. Second, there is trade diversion within domestic markets
as liquidity shifts out of domestic firms and into international firms.
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This paper assesses the question: what is the impact of firms that participate in 
international stock markets on the liquidity of the remaining firms in the domestic stock market?  
An extensive literature examines “international firms,” the firms that participate in international 
markets by issuing depositary receipts, cross-listing, or raising new capital (e.g., Alexander, Eun, 
and Janakirananan, 1987, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998, 1999, 2000; Miller, 1999; Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz, 2002; and the review by Karolyi, 1998).  This paper, instead, focuses on the 
impact of internationalization on “domestic firms,” the firms that do not internationalize.   
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of internationalization on the 
liquidity of domestic firms.  Consider first the “migration and spillover” argument.  According to 
the migration view, internationalization will induce a shift in the trading of international firms 
out of the domestic market and into international markets.  This may occur because foreign 
markets have lower transaction costs and are more liquid (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991).   
“Spillovers” means that a drop in the domestic trading of international firms hurts the liquidity of 
domestic firms.
1  This could occur because of fixed costs associated with operating a market, 
running brokerage firms, clearing and settling transactions, etc.  Thus, a drop in the domestic 
trading of international stocks increases the per trade cost of domestic stock transactions.   
Liquidity spillovers could also occur if investors shift their trading to international markets.  For 
example, investors may seek to diversify country-specific risk.  Thus, when some firms cross-list 
or issue depositary receipts in international markets, investors may attain country-specific 
diversification through these liquid international markets and therefore reduce their trading in 
                                                 
1 Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) argue that liquidity is more than an attribute of a single security.   
Individual liquidity tends to co-move with market liquidity.   2
domestic markets.
2  This involves a shift out of trading domestic stocks on domestic exchanges 
and into trading internationalized stocks on international exchanges.  Combined, migration and 
spillovers imply that internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of international firms due 
to migration, and the resultant drop in aggregate domestic liquidity reduces the liquidity of 
domestic firms due to spillovers.  
Some disagree with the migration and liquidity spillover view and instead argue that 
internationalization improves domestic market liquidity.  In contrast to the migration view, 
Hargis (2000) argues that cross-listing can transform a segmented equity market with low 
liquidity into an integrated market with high liquidity.  Similarly, Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1987) and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) hold that internationalization 
may actually stimulate domestic trading of international firms due to the increased integration of 
markets.  Also, if internationalization increases transparency, this could increase the domestic 
trading of international firms with positive spillover effects for the rest of the domestic market.  
Other skeptics of the migration spillover view could question the existence of liquidity 
spillovers, or doubt the economic importance of the impact of aggregate trading on the liquidity 
of domestic firms.  Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether internationalization induces 
migration and spillovers, or whether internationalization boosts the liquidity of domestic firms. 
Second, consider the “domestic trade diversion” view, which argues that 
internationalization induces a compositional shift in domestic market trading.  Firms that 
internationalize may become more attractive to those trading in domestic markets because of 
improvements in reputation, higher disclosure standards, the availability of more analysts that 
generate more information, and the expansion of the shareholder base in the context of 
                                                 
2 Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2003) and Edison and Warnock (2003) show that U.S. investors focus on firms 
that have internationalized.   3
segmented markets.
3  Thus, traders in the domestic market may shift their trading out of 
domestic firms and into the domestic trading of international firms.  All else equal, this domestic 
trade diversion implies less trading of domestic firms and greater trading of international firms in 
the domestic market.  However, some theories conflict with the trade diversion view and instead 
argue that internationalization may enhance integration and thereby boost liquidity of domestic 
firms (e.g., Alexander, et al., 1987; Domowitz, et al., 1998; Hargis, 2000).  This could occur 
because integration increases the liquidity of all firms in the local markets.  Moreover, 
integration may induce a compositional shift in domestic market liquidity toward domestic firms 
as the trading of international firms migrates abroad.  Again, theory provides conflicting 
predictions about the impact of firms that choose to internationalize on domestic firms. 
To study the effects of internationalization on domestic liquidity, this paper uses 
information on 3,253 domestic firms and 640 international firms across 55 emerging market 
countries during the years 1989 to 2000.  To measure liquidity, we use the turnover ratio, which 
equals the value of a firm’s transactions in a market divided by the market capitalization of the 
firm in the domestic market.  We use transactions data because bid-ask spreads are unavailable 
for our large panel of countries. 
The paper first examines the direct impact of internationalization on the liquidity of 
domestic firms.  Using annual, firm-level data, we regress the liquidity of domestic firms on the 
share of international firms in the domestic market as well as country and year dummy variables.  
While we cannot eliminate the possibility that an omitted factor is driving the results, we can 
control for an array of firm-specific and country specific traits.  We do a variety of robustness 
checks controlling for firm-specific characteristics (such as firm size, sales, firm profits, the 
                                                 
3 See, Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002), Coffee (1999), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002), Merton (1987), Portes 
and Rey (1999), and Reese and Weisbach (2001).  Also, Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2002) find that earnings 
releases impact the price and volume of international firms significantly more than domestics firms.   4
firm’s industry etc.) and various country-specific factors (e.g., trading of that country’s shares on 
international exchanges, economic development, legal system efficiency, international capital 
flow openness, inflation, etc.).  The results are consistent across numerous specifications. 
The data indicate that as more firms become international, this lowers the liquidity of 
domestic firms.  This result is robust to controlling for numerous firm-specific and country-
specific traits.  These initial results, however, do not shed light on the mechanisms through 
which internationalization hurts the liquidity of domestic firms. 
Next, the paper studies the channels through which international firms affect the liquidity 
of domestic firms.  We study both the (1) migration and liquidity spillover channel and (2) the 
domestic trade diversion channel.  Thus, we seek to explain the mechanisms through which 
internationalization influences the liquidity of domestic firms. 
To study the migration and liquidity spillover channel, we (a) assess whether the trading 
of international firms migrates from domestic to international markets and (b) test whether the 
domestic trading of international firms influences the liquidity of domestic firms.  We find 
evidence of migration: as the fraction of international firms rises, the trading of international 
firms shifts from domestic markets to international markets.  That is, as more firms 
internationalize, domestic liquidity of international firms falls.  Furthermore, we find evidence of 
liquidity spillovers.  The domestic trading of international shares is strongly, positively related to 
the liquidity of domestic firms.  Thus, the data are consistent with migration and spillover view: 
as the liquidity of international firms in the domestic market dries up because of migration, the 
liquidity of domestic firms diminishes because of spillovers. 
The migration and liquidity spillover channel, however, is not the only mechanism 
through which internationalization hurts the liquidity of domestic firms.  In particular, we find   5
that internationalization is negatively associated with the liquidity of domestic firms even after 
controlling for the migration and spillover channel.  Thus, we need to look beyond migration and 
spillovers to understand fully the impact of internationalization on the domestic market. 
Finally, we examine the domestic trade diversion channel.  The data suggest that as firms 
internationalize, the domestic market intensifies its trading of those international shares, while 
trading of firms that do not internationalize wanes.  This does not overturn the result mentioned 
above: internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of international shares.  This result is 
consistent with theories that emphasize that when a firm internationalizes this enhances its 
reputation, transparency, and shareholder base in ways that make it more attractive relative to 
domestic firms.  In sum, domestic trade diversion is another mechanism through which 
internationalization reduces the liquidity firms that do not internationalize. 
This paper’s assessment of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic 
firms is related to, though distinct from, a large literature on internationalization.  First, some 
research analyzes the impact of market integration on economic growth, investment, and asset 
pricing.
4  In this paper, we do not focus on financial integration broadly defined.  Rather, we 
examine the impact of the decision of one set of firms to cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or 
raise capital abroad on the liquidity of the domestic firms that do not internationalize.
5  Second, 
an extensive literature studies the effects of internationalization on international firms.  Some 
papers examine the volume and liquidity of international firms in local markets after firms cross-
list or issue depositary receipts.
6  Other researchers study the impact of internationalization on 
                                                 
4 See Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 2000), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001, 2002), Henry (2000), Levine and 
Zervos (1998a,b), and Martin and Rey (2000). 
5 Various publications voice concerns of markets becoming illiquid (e.g., Bovespa, 1996; Financial Times, 1998; 
and Latin Finance, 1999; The Economist, 2000; and the Federation des Bourses de Valeurs, 2000).  
6 See Foerster and Karolyi (1998, 2000), Hargis (1998), Noronha, Sarin, and Saudagaran (1996), and Pulatkonak 
and Sofianos (1999).   6
stock prices, the cost of capital, and growth opportunities.
7  A related line of research analyzes 
the effect of internationalization on asset size, growth, financing constraints, and the financial 
structure of firms that issue depositary receipts or cross-list.
8  Although in the course of our 
research we assess the impact of the liquidity of international firms on the domestic liquidity of 
those international firms, the focus of our research is different.  We concentrate on examining the 
impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms. 
Only two previous studies examine specifically the effects of internationalization on 
domestic firms.  Moel (2001) finds a negative association between the fraction of a country’s 
stocks that issue American depositary receipts (ADRs) and domestic market liquidity.  Karolyi 
(2003) also finds a negative link between ADRs and domestic market size and liquidity. 
This paper contributes to the literature on internationalization and the liquidity of 
domestic stocks in a number of ways.  First, this is the first paper to dissect the channels through 
which internationalization influences the liquidity of domestic stocks.  Thus, we evaluate the 
importance of the migration/spillover channel and the trade diversion channel.  Second, in 
examining the potential channels through which internationalization influences domestic stock 
liquidity, we examine the impact of firms that internationalize on both (a) the trading of 
international firms in the domestic market and (b) the liquidity of domestic firms.  Thus, besides 
contributing to the recent literature on the effects of internationalization on domestic firms, we 
also use our new database to augment the more established literature on international firms.  
Third, we substantially expand the sample size.  Our data cover 55 countries, which almost 
doubles the number of countries used in previous studies (e.g., Moel, 2001, examines 28 
                                                 
7 See Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Errunza and Miller 
(2000), Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1999), Miller (1999) and Stulz (1999). 
8 See Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002a), Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002), and Schmukler and 
Vesperoni (2001).   7
countries and Karolyi, 2003, studies 12).  Fourth, we extend the coverage of the 
internationalization process by moving beyond the ADR market in New York.  Specifically, we 
compile data on capital raisings that include global depositary receipts, cross-listings, and private 
placements in other international markets.  Thus, we can more precisely classify companies as 
international or domestic.  Fifth, we collect information on the international trading activities of 
international firms.  That is, we do not simply examine whether a firm is listed abroad or not; we 
incorporate time-vary trading data.  This has two advantages: (a) we control for country-specific 
news that influences global trading of that country’s shares and (b) we assess how the time-
varying extent of internationalization impacts domestic markets.  Sixth, we control for firm 
specific characteristics, including firm size and other traits, to isolate the marginal impact of 
internationalization on firm liquidity while holding firm-specific factors constant.   
Finally, we stress a limitation of this paper’s analyses.  We find that internationalization 
reduces the liquidity of domestic firms.  We do not, however, examine the net effect of 
internationalization (Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998).  Specifically, many researchers show that 
internationalization benefits those firms that choose to internationalize.  Furthermore, research 
finds that domestic market liquidity is important for the cost of capital, firm performance, and 
economic growth.
9  Thus, if internationalization helps international firms and hurts domestic 
firms, a critical question emerges: what is the net effect for the domestic economy of firms that 
cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital abroad?  We leave this for future research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the data.  Section III 
presents the results.  Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
9 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998a), and 
Beck and Levine (2003).   8
II. Data 
To assess the impact of internationalization on domestic stocks, we need the following 
data: 
1.  firm-level data on the international equity activities of firms, including  
a.  dates of capital raisings, cross-listing, and depositary receipts,  
b.  international trading data,  
2.  firm-level data on domestic stock transactions, 
3.  firm-level data on a range of firm attributes, and 
4.  country-specific data on macroeconomic, institutional, and financial conditions. 
 
An important contribution of this paper is that we collect considerably more data on the 
international equity market activities of companies than past studies.  The data for identifying 
each firm’s international activities come from two main sources: the Bank of New York and 
Euromoney.   
Besides the Bank of New York’s standard database (the Complete Depositary Receipt 
Directory) that contains information on current depositary receipt activities, the Bank of New 
York gave us access to their historical databases and reports on (i) depositary receipt program 
initiation dates, (ii) termination dates (if any), (iii) capital raisings, and (iv) trading activities.  
These data form a comprehensive database on American and Global depositary receipt programs.  
The historical data start in January 1956, but the vast majority of programs begin after 1980.   
We augment the information on dating the initiation of international equity market 
activities with data from Euromoney.  They provide the dates when firms raise equity capital in 
international capital markets, including cross-listings and issuance of global depositary receipts.  
Thus, the Euromoney data substantively enhances our ability to identify firms that 
internationalize.  The Euromoney database covers 8,795 cross-border equity issuance and cross-
listing operations from 5,665 firms in 86 countries over the period January 1983 - April 2001.  In 
terms of trading, we had access to data from the London and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges (LSE   9
and FSE respectively) on the trading of depositary receipts and cross-listed firm.  However, LSE 
trading data for these firms do not begin until 1997 and the data for the FSE do not start until 
1999.  Thus, they cannot be usefully incorporated into our panel studies that trace the impact of 
internationalization on the liquidity of domestic stocks and also assess the dynamic effects of 
trading in international markets on the domestic market.  Thus, consistent with existing studies, 
we do not include LSE and FSE trading data.  This will underestimate the amount of trading 
abroad, but this is unlikely to bias systematically the results in a particular direction.  See 
Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002b) for a description of some trends on the 
internationalization of stock markets as well as their relation to country characteristics. 
Consistent with our objective of assembling a broad database on internationalization, we 
classify firms as international if they (1) issue depositary receipts, (2) cross-list, or (3) raise 
capital through private placements abroad.  The first two clearly involve ongoing trading of 
domestic stocks in foreign countries.  However, raising capital through private placements is 
different because the new shares are not necessarily traded abroad.  Thus, the issuing of 
depositary receipts and cross-listing may involve the two potential channels discussed in the 
Introduction: migration/spillovers and trade diversion.  Raising capital abroad in the absence of 
cross-listing, however, will only potentially involve trade diversion in the domestic market since 
simply raising capital abroad cannot induce migration.  As noted below, we confirm this paper’s 
findings with various sub-samples. 
The firm-level domestic stock market trading data are from the Standard & Poor’s 
Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), which was formerly collected by the International 
Finance Corporation.  In cross-checking with country sources, the EMDB is very accurate, but 
for Argentina, we discovered that the EMDB information is inconsistent over time.  Thus, unlike   10
previous studies, we circumvent this problem by collecting the data directly from the Buenos 
Aires Stock Exchange.  The EMDB provides data on domestic market capitalization and 
domestic value traded in current U.S. dollars by firm.  Although the EMBD is the most 
comprehensive database on firm-level trading of equities around the world, the EMDB focuses 
mostly on emerging markets and does not include 100 percent of local firms (e.g., while varying 
by country, the EMDB typically covers about 70 percent of market capitalization). 
We also use balance sheet data on each firm to control for firm-specific characteristics 
that may influence liquidity.  Thus, we control for industry effects, firm size effects, and firm 
sales in assessing the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of firms in the domestic 
market.  For simplicity, in the results discussed below, we present the results controlling for firm 
size, but the results are robust to controlling for the other firm-specific effects.  We obtain these 
data from the Worldscope database (Thomson Financial Company). 
The firm-level data on domestic stock market trading, the firm-level balance sheet 
information, and international equity activities are all matched at the firm level over the period 
1989-2000.  Appendix Table 1 lists the 55 countries in the study and the number of domestic and 
international firms per country, as well as summary statistics of the main variables under study.  
In total, we have over 18,000 firm-year observations.  Appendix Table 2 provides additional 
information on data sources.
10   
As a robustness check, we also control for country-specific information.  Data are from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Data on the efficiency of each country’s legal 
system are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services).   
Information on official restrictions on international capital flows is from the International 
                                                 
10 Note, that some countries in our sample do not have any international firms.  We keep these in the sample as a 
control sample.  Importantly, we confirm this paper’s results when we eliminate countries with zero or only 
one international firm.   11
Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  In 
additional tests, we control for economic growth, inflation, real interest rates, terms of trade 
changes, time trend, and alternative measures of capital account openness that we describe 
below.   
Although our data have the limitations noted above, the database has several advantages 
over previous work.  First, the data cover 55 countries, which – as we noted earlier – almost 
double the number of countries used in previous studies and increase the power of our tests.  
Second, our dataset includes information on the international equity market activities of firms 
beyond depositary receipts in New York.  We collect information on issuance of equity, 
including cross-listing, in major financial markets.  Thus, we can much more accurately identify 
which firms have internationalized.  Third, we collect information on the international trading 
activities of each firm with a depositary receipt program.  Thus, in assessing the impact of 
internationalization on domestic market liquidity, we move beyond considering whether a 
company has internationalized or not.  By incorporating time-vary trading data, we can assess the 
dynamic effects of internationalization.  
   12
III. Methodology and Results 
This section empirically examines the impact of international firms, those that issue 
depositary receipts, cross-list, or raise new capital abroad, on domestic firms, those that do not 
internationalize.  To do this, we first examine whether internationalization has a direct effect on 
the liquidity of domestic firms?  Second, we examine whether internationalization affects 
domestic liquidity through the migration and spillover channel.  Third, we test whether 
internationalization influences the liquidity of domestic firms through trade diversion.  
A. Direct Effect 
1. Method 
To examine whether internationalization is directly related to the liquidity of domestic 
equities, we estimate the following regression using feasible generalized least squares with 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
c,t j t c t c j t c
I
t c t c
D
t c j n F M IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × = . (1) 
D
t c j T , ,  is the turnover ratio of domestic firm j in country c in year t, which equals the total 
value of trades of firm j’s stock during year t divided by firm j’s market capitalization.
11  The 
superscript D designates that it is a domestic firm during the entire sample period, i.e., it never 
internationalizes.  We define the dependent variable in this way because we want to examine the 
effects of internationalization on the firms that rely on the domestic market throughout the 
sample period.  By focusing on those firms that never access international capital markets, we 
test how their liquidity changes as other firms internationalize.  In all regressions, we control for 
                                                 
11 Since in some cases the value traded is zero, we use the natural logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio in the 
regressions.  An alternative measure of liquidity is the number of shares traded in one year divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.  This alternative abstracts from price changes.  But, it is impossible to usefully 
aggregate across different stocks to obtain country-level liquidity measures using this alternative measure.     13
country and time effects ( t c n τ   and    respectively), but do not report these in the tables to save 
space.   
  ,t c IS  is the share of international firms in country c at time t.  Thus,    ,t c IS is the number 
of international firms from country c at time t divided by the total number of firms listed in the 
domestic market for country c at time t.  In computing    ,t c IS , a firm is considered an 
international firm from the year it issues a depositary receipt, cross-lists, or raises capital abroad.  
If, however, the firm terminates its depositary receipt listing or de-lists from an international 
exchange, then the numerator of    ,t c IS falls by one.
12   
I
t c IT ,  is the aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in international 
equity markets at time t.  Thus,
I
t c IT ,  equals the aggregate value traded of all of country c’s 
international firms in international markets divided by the market capitalization of those 
international firms.  
We include the variable 
I
t c IT ,  because we want to control for trading of country c’s 
equities on international exchanges.  Information about a country’s political and economic 
conditions may induce trading of that country’s stocks in both international and domestic 
markets.  This effect would be captured by a positive coefficient on 
I
t c IT , .  To assess the 
independent impact of the share of firms in a country that are international on domestic liquidity, 
we seek to abstract from time-varying country specific factors influencing trading.  Hence, we 
include the trading of country c’s stocks in international markets in regression (1).    
Mc,t is a matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables.  We include 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita since the level of economic development may influence 
                                                 
12 Since firms can list abroad without listing in the domestic markets, this ratio could, in theory, be larger than one.   14
financial markets development (Levine, 2003).  We also include an index of the law and order 
tradition of the economy since the operation of legal systems may influence equity market 
development (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1998).  Furthermore, we control for the openness of the capital account to 
international capital flows (using data from the International Monetary Fund) since international 
financial integration may influence the liquidity of domestic equity markets (Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad, 2001, 2002).  We incorporate the macroeconomic and country-specific control 
variables because we want to assess the independent impact of internationalization on domestic 
liquidity.  Toward this end, we examined a variety of additional country-specific factors in 
robustness checks as discussed below.   
  , , t c j F  includes firm-specific characteristics in country c during year t.  We control for 
company level traits to assess the independent impact of internationalization on the trading of 
firms in the domestic market.  In the tables, we include the logarithm of the total assets in U.S. 
dollars.  In robustness checks, we control for many other firm characteristics. 
2. Results on the direct effect 
Contrary to a variety of theoretical models discussed in the Introduction, the Table 1 
results indicate that internationalization is negatively associated with the liquidity of domestic 
firms.  In particular, the coefficient on the share of international firms in country c at time t,  1 γ , 
is negative and significant at the one-percent level across all of the specifications that control for 
different combinations of regressors.  In terms of the other regressors, we do not find a strong 
link between the trading of international firms in international markets and the liquidity of 
domestic stocks.  Put differently, trading of country c’s international stocks on international 
exchanges (
I
t c IT , ) is not robustly related with the liquidity of domestic stocks.  Also, rich   15
countries and countries with a strong law and order tradition tend to have domestic firms with 
greater liquidity.  Finally, we see that the variable, total assets, enters with a negative coefficient.  
The reason for the negative coefficient is that total assets is closely linked with market 
capitalization, which is the denominator of the dependent variable.  As we will see below 
however, when we compare the trading of stocks within a country, the equities of bigger 
companies trade more than those of smaller companies.  In sum, as the share of international 
firms in an economy rises – i.e., as the fraction of firms in an economy that issue depositary 
receipts, cross-list, or raise capital abroad rises, the liquidity of remaining firms falls.   
The adverse impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms is not only 
statistically significant; it is economically relevant.  For instance, consider the last regression 
coefficient based on the regression with all of the regressors included (-2.2).  This estimate 
implies that a two-standard deviation increase in the share of international firms (0.086) will 
cause the liquidity of domestic firms to fall by -0.19.  This is substantial given that the mean 
value of the liquidity of domestic firms (
D
t c j T , , ) is 0.50.
13   
Some caution, however, is needed in interpreting these initial results.  Some may argue 
that the results simply reflect the possibility that firms that internationalize are good firms and 
firms that do not internationalize are comparatively poor.  While potentially true, this would not 
negate the value of the Table 1 results.  First, some theories discussed in the Introduction suggest 
that internationalization boosts domestic liquidity by making markets more integrated.  We find 
no evidence for this.  Second, we confirm the Table 1 results when controlling for many firm-
specific traits (as discussed below).  Thus, even when controlling for firm quality, we get the 
same result.  Third, the argument that bad firms remain domestic does not necessarily predict 
                                                 
13 Of course, this type of experiment is only for illustrative purposes.  Two standard deviations is not a marginal 
change and we do not specify what drives the change in internationalization.   16
that trading in those firms will diminish as good firms become international, which is what we 
find in Table 1.  Fourth, we obtain the same results even when we restrict the sample to firms 
that trade for the entire sample period.  Thus, uncompetitive firms that lose liquidity and drop out 
of the sample do not drive the results.  Fifth, as we show below, the results indicate that the 
liquidity of international firms in the domestic market falls with internationalization, which is 
inconsistent with a simple story that international firm liquidity thrives while domestic firm 
liquidity falls.  An additional weakness with the results thus far is that we do not provide 
information on the mechanisms linking internationalization to domestic firm liquidity.  Although 
regression (1) provides information on the direct impact of internationalization on the liquidity of 
domestic firms, it does not provide information on the channels through which 
internationalization affects the liquidity of domestic firms.  We turn to this now. 
 
B. Migration and Liquidity Spillover Channel 
The migration and liquidity spillover view predicts a two-stage channel through which 
internationalization may influence the liquidity of domestic stocks.  First, internationalization 
may reduce the domestic trading of international firms as the trading of international firms 
migrates to more liquid, lower cost international markets.  Second, the reduction in trading of 
international firms in domestic markets because of migration may hurt the liquidity of domestic 
firms because of liquidity spillovers.  Taken together, migration and liquidity spillovers provide 
a theory of how internationalization might reduce the liquidity of domestic firms.  As discussed 
in the Introduction, theoretical debate exists on each of these two mechanisms that define the 
migration and spillover channel.  We assess empirically each of these channels.    17
1.  The migration part of the migration and liquidity spillover channel 
To examine the migration component of the migration and liquidity spillover channel we 
use three different regression specifications.  Consider first the simple specification that assesses 
the impact of internationalization on the domestic liquidity of international firms. 
c,t j t c t c j t c
I
t c j t c
I
t c j n F M IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × = . (2) 
I
t c j T , ,  is the turnover ratio of international firm j in country c in year t.  The superscript I 
designates that it is an international firm, which is a firm that has either issued a depositary 
receipt, cross-listed, or raised capital abroad at some point in the sample.  Thus, the definition of 
an international firm in equation (2) is consistent with the definition of domestic firms in 
equation (1).  In these first analyses, we simply split the sample between firms that never 
internationalize and firms that become international at some point in the sample.  Below, we will 
assess the impact of an individual firm’s decision to internationalize on its liquidity within the 
domestic market. 
I
t c j IT , ,  is the aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in international 
equity markets at time t, excluding the trading of company j.  The other variables are the same as 
those in equation (1). 
Table 2 provides strong evidence that internationalization exerts a negative impact on the 
domestic liquidity of international firms.  The coefficient on    ,t c IS  always enters significantly 
and negatively.  As in Table 1, we control for the international trading of international firms 
(
I
t c j IT , , ).  We do this to control for other factors influencing the trading of that country’s equities.  
I
t c j IT , ,  enters positively, though in some specifications only at the ten-percent level, which 
indicates a positive link between the trading of a country’s stocks abroad and the trading of those   18
international firms in the local market.  In sum, after controlling for many factors, we find that as 
a country’s firms internationalize this negatively influences the domestic liquidity of 
international firms.   
The second regression we use to examine the migration component of the migration and 
liquidity spillover channel controls for the domestic liquidity of international firms in addition to 
the international liquidity of international firms.  Thus, to assess the independent impact of the 
share of international firms in a country on the domestic liquidity of individual international 
firms we now control for the aggregate liquidity of international firms in both international and 
domestic markets.  
Specifically, we estimate equation (3). 




t c j t c
I
t c j n F M T IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , , , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × = . (3) 
I
t c j T , ,  is the aggregate domestic turnover ratio of international firms, respectively, excluding the 
trading of company j.   
Table 3 shows that internationalization lowers the domestic liquidity of international 
firms, i.e., there is a negative and significant coefficient on    ,t c IS .  Thus, even when controlling 
for many factors, the domestic liquidity of international firms falls as the share of firms in the 
economy with international equity market operations rises. 
The Table 3 results also provide some preliminary evidence on spillovers.  The 
coefficient on 
I
t c j T , ,  enters positively and significantly.  Thus, aggregate trading of international 
firms in the local market positively influences the trading of individual international firms in the 
local market.  We examine liquidity spillovers in greater depth below.   19
The third regression we employ to test for migration examines the relative trading of an 
international firm in international and domestic markets.  Thus, we examine whether the fraction 
of trading of an international firm shifts from domestic to international markets as more firms 
internationalize.  So far, we have examined the impact of internationalization on the level of the 
domestic trading of international firms.  But the domestic liquidity of international firms can be 
influenced by several factors, including how attractive an international company is relative to 
other companies.  Therefore, a more direct method for studying migration is to analyze the share 
of the company’s liquidity in the domestic market relative to its total liquidity.   
Thus, we estimate the following regression for international firms. 









t c j n F M T IT IS
IT T
T
, 2 1 , , 1 , , , , , 2 , 1
, , , ,
, , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × =
+
. (4) 
The dependent variable in this equation measures the level of domestic liquidity of firm j relative 
to firm j’s total liquidity, which includes the domestic liquidity of firm j and the international 
liquidity of firm j.  Since the market capitalization is the same in the numerator and denominator, 
this measure is equivalent to using the ratio of value traded in the domestic market to total value 
traded.  Importantly, we control for the aggregate liquidity of country c’s international firms, 
excluding firm j (   , ,
I
t c j T ).  Thus, we control for the aggregate liquidity of firm j’s markets when 
assessing the impact of internationalization on whether the trading of firm j shifts abroad. 
Table 4 presents regressions that are consistent with migration.  There is a negative and 
significant coefficient on    ,t c IS .  This indicates that internationalization (an increase in the 
proportion of international firms in the domestic market) reduces the proportion of trading of 
international firms in domestic markets.  As above, we control for many factors, including the   20
liquidity of country c’s stocks (
I
t c j IT , , ) in international markets and also the domestic liquidity of 
country c’s international firms (   , ,
I
t c j T ). 
Table 4 also provides evidence consistent with the existence of liquidity spillovers.  Note 
that    , ,
I
t c j T  has a positive and significant coefficient.  Also, note that this holds while controlling 
for the liquidity of country c’s international stocks in international markets (
I
t c j IT , , ).  Thus, 
proportion of trading of firm j that occurs in the domestic market is positively affected by the 
aggregate liquidity of the domestic market (excluding firm j), i.e., aggregate liquidity influences 
the liquidity of individual stocks. 
2.  The liquidity spillover part of the migration and liquidity spillover channel 
Next, we further examine liquidity spillovers.  Does aggregate trading in a market 
influence the liquidity of individual domestic stocks?  If there is migration – if 
internationalization induces a shift in the trading of international firms from domestic to 
international markets – and if there are liquidity spillovers, then this represents a two-part 
channel through which internationalization affects the liquidity of domestic firms. 
Besides the evidence on liquidity discussed above that focuses on whether aggregate 
liquidity influences the trading of international firms in the local market, we estimate an 
extension of equation (1) that focuses on the liquidity of domestic firms.   
c,t j t c t c j t c t c
I
t c t c
D
t c j n F M T IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 ,
I
, , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × = . (5) 
The difference between equation (1) and equation (5) is that equation (5) controls for the 
aggregate liquidity of international firms in the domestic market.  Specifically, 
I
,t c T  equals the 
domestic turnover of international firms in country c at time t.    21
Table 5 provides positive evidence of liquidity spillovers.  As shown, there is a positive 
and significant coefficient on 
I
,t c T  in all of the specifications.  The aggregate liquidity of 
international firms in the domestic market positively influences the liquidity of individual 
domestic firms above and beyond (i) the aggregate liquidity of international firms in 
international markets (
I
t c IT , ), (ii) the degree of internationalization (   ,t c IS ), (iii) macroeconomic 
and country-specific controls (   ,t c M ), (iv) firm-specific traits (   , , t c j F ), and (v) country and time 
effects ( t c n τ   and    respectively).  Thus, the positive coefficient on 
I
,t c T  presents evidence of 
positive liquidity spillovers. 
The regression results presented in Tables 2-5 are consistent with the migration and 
liquidity spillover channel.  We find that (a) internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of 
international firms and (b) the domestic liquidity of international firms exerts a positive impact 
on the liquidity of domestic firms.  Taken together, these results imply that internationalization 
hurts the liquidity of domestic firms through the migration and liquidity spillover channel.  
Note, however, that the migration and liquidity spillover channel is not the whole story.  
In Table 5 when we control for the liquidity of international firms in the domestic market, 
  ,t c IS still enters negatively and significantly.  Thus, the liquidity of domestic firms is negatively 
influenced by the share of international firms in a market beyond the aggregate trading of 
international firms in the domestic economy (
I
,t c T ) and in international markets (
I
t c IT , ) and after 
controlling for country-specific and firm-specific factors.  If migration and liquidity spillovers 
were the only channel through which internationalization affected the liquidity of domestic 
stocks, then    ,t c IS should enter insignificantly after controlling for the liquidity spillover channel.    22
The fact that    ,t c IS remains significant suggests that internationalization is influencing domestic 
liquidity through an additional mechanism.  
 
C. The Trade Diversion Channel 
1. Method 
Trade diversion is an additional channel through which internationalization can influence 
domestic stock liquidity.  We assess whether internationalization induces a compositional shift in 
the domestic market from the trading of domestic stocks to the trading of international stocks.  
More specifically, does the proportion of the overall liquidity of the domestic stock market 
accounted for by a particular firm rise simply because it becomes an international firm?   
To study the trade diversion channel, we estimate the following equation: 
c,t j t c t c j t c j t c
I









, ,  is firm j’s share of turnover in country c in year t relative to the total turnover of 
country c’s domestic stock market in year t, where total turnover includes the domestic trading of 
both domestic and international firms.  We also used value traded instead of the turnover ratio 
and obtained similar results.  
t c j I , ,  is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is international and zero 
otherwise.  Note, that this dummy turns from zero to one when a firm internationalizes. 
I
t c j IT , ,  is the international trading of company j and equals zero for domestic firms.     23
t c j MCap , ,  is the market capitalization of firm j.  We include this variable to control for 
the fact that the share of turnover in firm j might tend to rise when the price of the stock rises or 
when the number of shares outstanding increase.
14 
Finally, we continue to control for the trading of international firms in international 
markets.  We do this to control for as many firm- and country-specific factors as possible and 
focus on the marginal impact of internationalization of the proportion of domestic liquidity 
accounted for by international firms.  We control for firm-specific factors, macroeconomic traits, 
year dummies, and country dummies. 
2.  Results on the trade diversion channel 
The Table 6 results indicate that internationalization reduces the proportion of liquidity of 
domestic firms in the local market through the trade diversion channel.  The coefficient, φ1, on 
Ij,c,t enters with a positive coefficient in all of the Table 6 specifications.  Thus, the proportion of 
the overall liquidity of the domestic stock market accounted for by a particular firm rises simply 
because it becomes international.  Furthermore, note that the size of a company (total assets) is 
positively associated with the share of liquidity of that company in the local market.  In sum, the 
results are consistent with the view that internationalization induces a compositional shift in the 
local market toward comparatively less trading of domestic stock and greater liquidity of 
international stocks. 
As noted in the Introduction, alternative theories predict trade intensification, not trade 
diversion.  These alternative views hold that internationalization will induce more active trading 
of domestic stocks, not less.  In contrast, our results support the view that internationalization 
                                                 
14 In the previous specifications, we do not include market capitalization among the independent variables because 
the dependent variables are already scaled by market capitalization.     24
induces trade diversion.  As firms internationalize, the domestic market becomes more focused 
on trading those international companies. 
 
D. Robustness Issues 
First, there may be concerns that the entry and exit of domestic and international firms 
will affect the results.  Thus, estimated all regressions holding constant the number of firms in 
the sample.  We obtained the same results with the control sample.   
Second, we incorporated additional macroeconomic and country-specific control 
variables to evaluate the independent impact of internationalization on domestic liquidity.  For 
instance, we included the inflation rate since inflation may interfere with trading and reduce 
market liquidity (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001).  We also controlled for economic growth 
since business-cycle phenomenon may influence market activity.  We examined terms of trade 
changes since shocks may importantly influence equity market transactions.  In other 
specifications, we included the real interest rate, a broad index of financial liberalization 
developed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), and a time trend.  Including these additional 
macroeconomic controls did not change the results on the impact of internationalization on the 
liquidity of domestic firms.   
Third, we included an assortment of microeconomic regressors to control for firm-
specific and industry-specific factors influencing stock liquidity.  This is important since firm-
specific traits may lead high-performing firms to internationalize and poorly performing firms to 
remain domestic. Thus, we included industry dummy variables and information on firm sales and 
profits.  Controlling for these additional microeconomic factors did not change the findings.  
Moreover, even when including array of firm-specific variables, macroeconomic controls,   25
industry dummy variables, year dummies, and country dummy variables, we continued to 
confirm the papers findings.  While we are unable to rule out the possibility that some third 
factor is driving the results, the findings remained robust to many controls. 
Fourth, to measure spillover effects in a different way, we estimated equations (3), (4), 
and (5) including the aggregate domestic liquidity of both domestic and international firms, 
instead of the liquidity of only international firms.  We confirmed this paper’s conclusions.   
Fifth, our measure of internationalization is based on the number of firms becoming 
international.  It may be appropriate to weight internationalization by the size and activity of the 
firm that is cross-listing, issuing depositary receipts, or raising capital abroad.  Thus, we 
computed an internationalization measure based on the value traded of the internationalizing 
firm.  We again confirmed this paper’s findings. 
Sixth, we re-defined internationalization by excluding the cases in which firms raise 
private capital in international markets and, at the same time, do not issue a depositary receipts or 
cross-list.  These cases are only a small proportion (less than 10 percent) of the 
internationalization episodes.  Excluding them did not alter the results of the paper.  
Seventh, we also experimented with interaction terms.  We examined whether 
internationalization has a different impact on domestic firms depending on their size or other 
characteristics.  Thus, we assessed whether the liquidity of big firms that do not 
internationalization falls more or less than smaller firms that do not internationalize.  We also 
examined firm profitability, sales, etc.  We found no evidence of these interaction terms entering 
significantly.   26
Eighth, in our sample, 19 out of 55 countries have zero or only one international firm.  
Thus, we re-did the analyses eliminating all 19 of these countries.  We got the same results with 
this alternative sample.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper finds that the internationalization of stock markets has a negative effect on the 
stock market liquidity of domestic firms.  We studied in detail how this effect takes place.   
Liquidity migrates to international financial markets, having negative spillover effects on the 
liquidity of domestic firms in domestic markets.  Furthermore, there is trade diversion in 
domestic markets as trading shifts from domestic to international stocks within the local market.  
As a result, we were able to identify two channels through which internationalization hurts 
domestic firms.   
The findings in this paper have opened several avenues for future research.  First, a 
theoretical model that more comprehensively specifies the mechanisms influencing the impact of 
internationalization on domestic markets would substantively sharpen the interpretation of this 
paper’s results and shape future empirical work.  Second, although this paper finds strong 
evidence of liquidity spillovers, we do not identify the source of these spillovers.  To better 
understand the operation of financial markets, future research might usefully dissect the sources 
of liquidity spillovers.  Third, it would be interesting to understand the net effect of 
internationalization.  Some papers have argued that internationalization has positive effects on 
the firms that internationalize.  This paper has shown that internationalization hurts the liquidity 
of domestic firms.  What is the net effect for the economy?  What is the future for domestic   27
markets and companies that are unable to internationalize?  We believe these questions represent 
fruitful areas for future research. 
   28
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 Table 1: Effects of Internationalization on Domestic Firms 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms.  Using firm-level data from 55 countries, during the years 1989-2000, 
and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports results of the following regression equation:
   
c,t j t c t c j t c
I
t c t c
D
t c j n F M IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × = .  
D
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio of domestic firm j in country c during 
year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s market capitalization.    ,t c IS  is the share of international 
firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  
I
t c IT ,  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in 
international equity markets during year t.  Mc,t is a matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per 
capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness 
(Capital Account Liberalization).     , , t c j F  is a vector of firm j characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm 
as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the regression  t c n τ   and   represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year 
Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not reported in the tables.  T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
IS c,t -0.942 *** -2.483 *** -2.422 *** -2.340 *** -2.362 *** -2.203 ***
[4.349] [6.714] [6.413] [6.130] [6.323] [5.622]
IT
I
c,t  0.023 -0.048 -0.077 -0.005 -0.050 -0.043
[0.513] [0.866] [1.346] [0.087] [0.908] [0.792]
Log of GDP per capita 0.123 *** 0.112 **
[2.642] [2.397]
Law and Order 0.034 *** 0.025 **
[2.964] [2.189]
Capital Account  -0.032 -0.034
Liberalization [1.521] [1.558]
Log of Total Assets -0.062 *** -0.063 *** -0.062 *** -0.058 *** -0.059 ***
[8.891] [8.921] [8.940] [8.243] [8.310]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 2,531 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,276 1,276
Number of Observations 14,382 6,735 6,735 6,735 6,556 6,556
R-squared 0.629 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.654 0.655
Log of One Plus the Turnover Ratio of Domestic Firms
Dependent Variable:Table 2: Effects of Internationalization on International Firms 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of international firms within the domestic market.  Using firm-level data from 55 
countries, during the years 1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports 
results of the following regression equation:   c,t j t c t c j t c
I
t c j t c
I
t c j n F M IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × = . 
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover 
ratio of international firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s market 
capitalization.    ,t c IS  is the share of international firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  
I
t c j IT , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate 
turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in international equity markets during year t, excluding the trading of company j.  Mc,t is a matrix of macroeconomic and 
country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per capita), an index of the law and order 
tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).     , , t c j F  is a vector of firm j characteristics in country c 
during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the regression  t c n τ   and   represent 
country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not reported in the tables. 
T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.   
 
 
IS c,t -1.187 *** -1.319 *** -1.388 *** -1.152 *** -1.377 *** -1.345 ***
[4.776] [3.774] [3.905] [3.344] [3.971] [3.899]
0.137 ** 0.113 * 0.119 * 0.155 ** 0.111 * 0.171 ***
[1.997] [1.778] [1.839] [2.393] [1.736] [2.586]
Log of GDP per capita -0.038 -0.084
[0.716] [1.557]
Law and Order 0.047 *** 0.053 ***
[3.395] [3.610]
Capital Account  0.007 0.013
Liberalization  [0.249] [0.440]
Log of Total Assets -0.012 * -0.012 -0.013 * -0.012 * -0.012 *
[1.653] [1.570] [1.822] [1.663] [1.685]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 634 548 548 548 548 548
Number of Observations 3,863 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,910 2,910
R-squared 0.643 0.658 0.658 0.659 0.654 0.656
Log of One Plus the Turnover Ratio of International Firms
Dependent Variable:
I
t c j IT
, ,Table 3: Effects of Internationalization on International Firms - Beyond Spillovers 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of international firms within the domestic market.  Using firm-level data from 55 
countries, during the years 1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports 




t c j t c
I
t c j n F M T IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 , , , , , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × = . 
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus 
the turnover ratio of international firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s 
market capitalization.     ,t c IS  is the share of international firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  
I
t c j IT , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the 
aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in international equity markets during year t, excluding the trading of company j.  
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one 
plus the turnover ratio of international firms within the domestic market, excluding the trading of company j.  Mc,t is a matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific 
control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the 
country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).     , , t c j F  is a vector of firm j characteristics in country c during year t, 
which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the regression  t c n τ   and   represent country-specific and 
year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in 
brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
IS c,t -0.796 *** -0.849 ** -0.845 ** -0.744 ** -0.885 ** -0.834 **
[3.256] [2.449] [2.459] [2.162] [2.560] [2.448]
0.025 0.006 0.006 0.037 0.001 0.037
[0.402] [0.119] [0.112] [0.664] [0.013] [0.643]
0.498 *** 0.445 *** 0.445 *** 0.437 *** 0.443 *** 0.432 ***
[10.973] [8.914] [8.990] [8.768] [8.745] [8.641]
Log of GDP per capita 0.002 -0.027
[0.044] [0.546]
Law and Order 0.032 ** 0.032 **
[2.363] [2.301]
Capital Account  0.009 0.010
Liberalization  [0.341] [0.376]
Log of Total Assets -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 * -0.011 -0.012
[1.548] [1.526] [1.664] [1.559] [1.601]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 634 548 548 548 548 548
Number of Observations 3,863 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,910 2,910
R-squared 0.663 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.67 0.671
Log of One Plus the Turnover Ratio of International Firms
Dependent Variable: 
I
t c j T
, ,
I
t c j IT
, ,Table 4: Effects of Internationalization on Migration 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the relative liquidity of international firms in domestic versus international markets.  Using firm-level 
data from 55 countries, during the years 1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the 










t c j n F M T IT IS IT T T , 2 1 , , 1 , , , , , 2 , 1 , , , , , , ' ) ( ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × = + . The 
dependent variable measures the level of domestic turnover of firm j relative to firm j’s total turnover, which includes domestic turnover and turnover in international 
markets.  Specifically, 
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio in the domestic market of international firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio 
equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s market capitalization and where 
I
t c j IT , ,  equals the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio 
in international markets of firm j from country c during year t.     ,t c IS  is the share of international firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  
I
t c j IT , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international firms in international equity markets during year t, excluding the trading of 
company j.  
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio of international firms within the domestic market, excluding the trading of company j.  Mc,t is a matrix of 
macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per capita), an index 
of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).     , , t c j F  is a vector of firm j 
characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the regression 
t c n τ   and   represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not 
reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
IS c,t -0.807 *** -0.816 *** -0.901 *** -0.799 *** -0.815 *** -0.876 ***
[7.186] [5.914] [6.168] [5.957] [5.888] [6.136]
-0.108 *** -0.120 *** -0.114 *** -0.116 *** -0.115 *** -0.099 **
[3.407] [3.253] [3.097] [2.988] [3.101] [2.540]
0.068 *** 0.071 *** 0.068 *** 0.069 *** 0.072 *** 0.066 ***
[7.511] [5.974] [5.867] [5.618] [6.064] [5.453]
Log of GDP per capita -0.044 ** -0.048 **
[2.198] [2.242]
Law and Order 0.005 0.010 **
[1.101] [2.066]
Capital Account  -0.023 * -0.019
Liberalization [1.723] [1.388]
Log of Total Assets -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.544] [0.382] [0.586] [0.554] [0.460]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 621 535 535 535 535 535
Number of Observations 3,628 2,768 2,768 2,768 2,733 2,733
R-squared 0.974 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971
Log of One Plus the Share of Value Traded Domestically of International Firms
Dependent Variable: 
I
t c j T
, ,
I
t c j IT
, ,Table 5: Effects of Internationalization on Domestic Firms - Beyond Spillovers 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms.  Using firm-level data from 55 countries, during the years 1989-2000, 
and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports results of the following regression equation:  
c,t j t c t c j t c t c
I
t c t c
D
t c j n F M T IT IS T , 2 1 , , 1 ,
I
, , 2 , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ θ β γ γ + × + × + × + + × + × + × = . 
D
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio of domestic firm j in country c 
during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s market capitalization.   ,t c IS  is the share of 
international firms in country c in year t and is the measure of internationalization. 
I
t c IT ,  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate turnover ratio of country c’s international 
firms in international equity markets during year t.  
I
,t c T  equals the logarithm of one plus the domestic turnover of international firms in country c at during year t.  Mc,t is a 
matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per 
capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).     , , t c j F  is a 
vector of firm j characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  
In the regression  t c n τ   and   represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these 
coefficients are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
IS c,t -0.525 ** -1.269 *** -1.222 *** -1.234 *** -0.990 *** -0.927 **
[2.454] [3.711] [3.521] [3.509] [2.832] [2.565]
IT
I
c,t  -0.006 -0.095 * -0.120 ** -0.078 -0.095 * -0.123 **
[0.150] [1.808] [2.233] [1.554] [1.804] [2.443]
T
I
c,t  0.455 *** 0.418 *** 0.416 *** 0.412 *** 0.430 *** 0.429 ***
[18.391] [11.767] [11.703] [11.653] [11.833] [11.966]
Log of GDP per capita 0.108 ** 0.118 ***
[2.408] [2.652]
Law and Order 0.013 -0.001
[1.090] [0.055]
Capital Account  -0.064 *** -0.068 ***
Liberalization [2.980] [3.102]
Log of Total Assets -0.063 *** -0.064 *** -0.063 *** -0.059 *** -0.060 ***
[9.145] [9.151] [9.155] [8.516] [8.539]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 2,531 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,276 1,276
Number of Observations 14,382 6,735 6,735 6,735 6,556 6,556
R-squared 0.642 0.678 0.678 0.678 0.663 0.663
Log of One Plus the Turnover Ratio of Domestic Firms
Dependent Variable: Table 6: Effects of Internationalization on Domestic Firms - Trade Diversion Effects 
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the share of firm’s liquidity in the domestic market.  Using firm-level data from 55 countries, during 
the years 1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports results of the 
following regression equation:  c,t j t c t c j t c j t c
I
t c j t c j t c j n F MCap M IT I S , 2 1 , , 1 , , , , , 2 , , 1 , , ' ε τ δ δ λ κ θ φ φ + × + × + × + × + + × + × = . 
I D
t c t c j t c j T T S
+ = , , , , ,  is firm j’s share of turnover 
in country c in year t relative to the total turnover of country c’s domestic stock market in year t, where total turnover includes the domestic trading of both domestic and 
international firms.  t c j I , ,  is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is international and zero otherwise.  This dummy turns from zero to one when a firm 
internationalizes. 
I
t c j IT , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover of firm j from country c in international markets during year t.   t c j MCap , ,  is the market capitalization of 
firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm’s market capitalization.  Mc,t is a 
matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per 
capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).   , , t c j F  is a vector 
of firm j characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the 
regression  t c n τ   and   represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients 
are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
I j,c,t 0.080 *** 0.079 *** 0.080 *** 0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.080 ***
[3.948] [3.587] [3.624] [3.587] [3.646] [3.688]
IT
I
j,c,t  0.223 *** 0.091 0.094 0.091 0.087 0.089
[2.921] [1.110] [1.155] [1.106] [1.061] [1.091]
MCap  j,c,t -0.122 *** -0.133 *** -0.134 *** -0.133 *** -0.133 *** -0.134 ***
[19.864] [14.705] [14.766] [14.670] [14.593] [14.625]
Log of GDP per capita 0.134 *** 0.138 ***
[3.062] [3.102]
Law and Order -0.001 -0.009
[0.098] [0.699]
Capital Account  0.018 0.010
Liberalization [0.680] [0.371]
Log of Total Assets 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 ***
[2.765] [2.689] [2.752] [2.916] [2.842]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3,252 1,839 1,839 1,839 1,825 1,825
Number of Observations 18,488 9,744 9,744 9,744 9,526 9,526
R-squared 0.681 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.715 0.716
Log of One Plus the Share of Firm j Value Traded
Dependent Variable: 1 Argentina 47 18 29 1989 - 2000 0.399 0.283 0.500 0.071 0.315 668.2
2 Bahrain 15 1 14 1999 - 2000 0.094 0.369 0.693 0.000 0.000 337.4
3 Bangladesh 66 1 65 1996 - 2000 0.298 0.434 0.693 0.002 0.000 20.8
4 Botswana 9 0 9 1996 - 2000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 90.4
5 Brazil 105 36 69 1989 - 2000 0.305 0.360 0.589 0.024 0.237 1,419.6
6 Bulgaria 23 0 23 1996 - 2000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.6
7 Chile 58 22 36 1989 - 2000 0.078 0.131 0.419 0.047 0.182 827.9
8 China 251 94 157 1992 - 2000 0.973 0.802 0.680 0.133 0.041 669.6
9 Colombia 37 7 30 1989 - 2000 0.072 0.142 0.620 0.029 0.042 285.0
10 Cote d'Ivoire 15 0 15 1996 - 2000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 78.4
11 Croatia 10 2 8 1997 - 2000 0.061 0.039 0.693 0.020 0.000 265.6
12 Czech Republic 76 4 72 1994 - 2000 0.139 0.304 0.693 0.011 0.000 199.8
13 Ecuador 13 0 13 1996 - 2000 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 85.1
14 Egypt 84 11 73 1996 - 2000 0.274 0.338 0.693 0.003 0.000 162.0
15 Estonia 13 1 12 1997 - 2000 0.372 0.278 0.693 0.042 0.000 120.2
16 Ghana 11 1 10 1996 - 2000 0.084 0.001 0.118 0.035 0.163 101.5
17 Greece 86 14 72 1989 - 2000 0.417 0.411 0.691 0.017 0.005 655.0
18 Hungary 25 17 8 1992 - 2000 0.325 0.442 0.687 0.287 0.015 424.0
19 India 182 48 134 1989 - 2000 0.247 0.481 0.689 0.004 0.035 502.8
20 Indonesia 137 34 103 1989 - 2000 0.443 0.512 0.678 0.093 0.046 348.0
21 Israel 55 19 36 1997 - 2000 0.227 0.370 0.600 0.020 0.145 755.3
22 Jamaica 24 0 24 1996 - 2000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.2
23 Jordan 67 1 66 1989 - 2000 0.283 0.028 0.693 0.002 0.000 82.2
24 Kenya 20 1 19 1996 - 2000 0.047 0.073 0.693 0.007 0.000 73.1
25 Latvia 16 2 14 1997 - 2000 0.269 0.332 0.693 0.018 0.000 19.8
26 Lebanon 5 2 3 1999 - 2000 0.104 0.060 0.693 0.000 0.000 297.7
27 Lithuania 38 5 33 1996 - 2000 0.119 0.292 0.693 0.035 0.000 29.9
28 Malaysia 199 12 187 1989 - 2000 0.595 0.261 0.693 0.008 0.000 794.6
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This table reports summary statistics by country. It displays the total number of firms, the number of international firms, the number of domestic firms, the sample coverage, and the sample average of some of the variables used in
the regressions. The variables turnover and value traded are the log of one plus turnover and one plus value traded. International companies are the ones that issue a depositary receipt, cross-list, or raise capital in a foreign stock
exchange at any time in the sample.
Log Turnover in 
the Domestic 
Market       
(International 
Firms)





Log Ratio of Value 
Traded in the Domestic 
Market to Total Value 
Traded             
(International Firms)
Log Share of 
International 
Firms29 Mauritius 17 0 17 1996 - 2000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 84.5
30 Mexico 101 42 59 1989 - 2000 0.253 0.373 0.522 0.153 0.480 1,443.8
31 Morocco 21 2 19 1996 - 2000 0.089 0.149 0.693 0.010 0.000 488.4
32 Namibia 8 0 8 1999 - 2000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 29.3
33 Nigeria 41 0 41 1989 - 2000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 66.0
34 Oman 34 0 34 1999 - 2000 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 76.2
35 Pakistan 124 5 119 1989 - 2000 0.210 1.030 0.693 0.004 0.000 80.2
36 Peru 43 8 35 1992 - 2000 0.511 0.228 0.590 0.015 0.151 230.1
37 Philippines 78 38 40 1989 - 2000 0.424 0.324 0.685 0.096 0.032 566.8
38 Poland 45 17 28 1992 - 2000 0.572 0.317 0.693 0.038 0.000 395.7
39 Portugal 47 12 35 1989 - 1999 0.230 0.269 0.671 0.039 0.034 669.9
40 Romania 53 2 51 1997 - 2000 0.243 0.037 0.693 0.000 0.000 17.7
41 Russia 42 5 37 1996 - 2000 0.156 0.275 0.627 0.015 0.015 1,395.4
42 Saudi Arabia 22 0 22 1997 - 2000 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,133.5
43 Slovak Republic 20 2 18 1996 - 2000 0.354 0.143 0.693 0.009 0.000 60.7
44 Slovenia 20 2 18 1996 - 2000 0.332 0.324 0.693 0.030 0.000 104.7
45 South Africa 102 33 69 1992 - 2000 0.179 0.233 0.601 0.029 0.033 1,749.1
46 South Korea 230 30 200 1989 - 2000 1.196 0.891 0.683 0.014 0.042 809.7
47 Sri Lanka 66 2 64 1992 - 2000 0.125 0.216 0.693 0.004 0.000 26.2
48 Taiwan, Province of China 143 30 113 1989 - 2000 1.506 1.203 0.691 0.027 0.022 1,615.9
49 Thailand 125 31 94 1989 - 2000 0.789 0.602 0.693 0.048 0.000 633.8
50 Trinidad and Tobago 12 0 12 1996 - 2000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 215.0
51 Tunisia 18 1 17 1996 - 2000 0.093 0.134 0.693 0.007 0.000 136.4
52 Turkey 78 16 62 1989 - 2000 1.019 0.659 0.691 0.026 0.002 632.8
53 Ukraine 19 0 19 1997 - 2000 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 80.2
54 Venezuela 23 6 17 1989 - 2000 0.190 0.222 0.570 0.037 0.302 328.1
55 Zimbabwe 34 3 31 1989 - 2000 0.099 0.159 0.693 0.020 0.000 64.4
Total 3,253 640 2,613 0.344 0.288 0.491 0.023 0.041 523.501
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Variables related to the 
internationalization of stock 
markets
The data come from Bank of New York (1989-2000) and Euromoney (1980-2000). This information is
used to classify firms as domestic or international companies. International companies are the ones
that issue a depositary receipt, cross-list, or raise capital in a foreign stock exchange at any time in the
sample.  Different variables are constructed using this variable.  See text for details.
Bank of New York and Euromoney
Domestic market capitalization 
(current U.S. dollars)
Market capitalization in domestic stock markets. Standard & Poor's (former International Finance Corporation) Emerging Markets 
Database
Domestic value traded                 
(current U.S. dollars)
Value traded in domestic stock markets. Standard & Poor's (former International Finance Corporation) Emerging Markets 
Database
Value traded in foreign markets   
(current U.S. dollars)
Value traded in depository receipts covering the period 1989-2000. Series are computed on a firm-
level basis by adding the different depositary receipts that belong to each company on a yearly basis. 
Bank of New York
GDP per capita at market prices 
(current U.S. dollars) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) divided by mid-year population. The GDP at purchaser prices data is
converted from domestic currencies using yearly official exchange rates. For the cases in which the
official exchange rate is different from the market rate, the latter is used.
World Bank: World Development Indicators
Law and order Qualitative variable that ranges from 1 to 6, where higher numbers indicate higher "levels"of law and
order. Law and order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three
points. The law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system,
while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can
have a high rating in terms of its judicial system, for example 3, but a low rating, for example 1, if the
law is ignored for a political aim, e.g. widespread strikes involving illegal practices. The data cover the
period 1984-2000 for all countries.
Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide
Capital account  liberalization 
(IMF)
Dummy that equals one on and after the year of capital account liberalization, and zero elsewhere. The
data cover the period 1975-2000 for all countries.
International Monetary Fund: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions
Total assets Total assets as reported in Worldscope for each firm-year, in million of U.S. dollars. The sample
covers the period 1989-2000 for all countries.
Worldscope
Appendix Table 2
Series Description and Data Sources
This table shows the description of the data used and their coverage and sources.